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On October 15, 2003, in Pinnelas Park, Florida, thefeeding tube of Terri Schiavo, a 33 year oldseverely brain damaged woman was removed by
court order after a 10 year legal battle between her hus-
band and her parents (Stacy, 2003). The expectation was
that she would die in a week or ten days. The parents of
the patient wanted to care for their daughter and keep
her alive in the hospice where she had lived for several
years. Her husband said she would rather die. The
patient’s sister, Suzanne, called the feeding tube removal
“judicial homicide.” It is not clear whether the patient
had written a living will expressing her wishes not to live
in a chronic vegetative state or had so stated orally to her
husband Michael, who claimed that he was carrying out
his wife’s wishes that she not be kept alive artificially.
This seems to represent clear and convincing evidence of
Mrs. Schiavo’s wishes, thus allowing the court to order
the removal of the feeding tube. Complicating this case
is a conflict of interest or bias on the part of the husband
because he is engaged to another woman and they have
a child together. The family also alleges that the husband
Michael abused his wife, accusations which have not
been substantiated. Michael Schiavo also refused to
divorce his wife, fearing that his wife’s parents would
ignore her wishes to die if they became her guardians.
The legislature in the state of Florida quickly passed a
law granting the Governor the power to override the
court, which ordered the removal of the feeding tube.
Governor Jeb Bush signed the legislation and promptly
overruled the court and ordered the feeding tube to be
reinserted. At the time of my writing this essay, the
dénouement or outcome of this case has not yet
occurred. It is expected to go through several appeals
before a final determination is made in this unusual right
to die case of Terri Schiavo.
Many similar right to die cases have been discussed and
debated over the past three decades, one of the most
famous being the case of Nancy Cruzan in Missouri. This
unfortunate young woman was in a persistent vegeta-
tive state for many years in an institution in Missouri,
being kept alive with a feeding tube. Her parents peti-
tioned the Supreme Court in Missouri to allow removal
of the feeding tube. The case eventually was heard by
the United States Supreme Court, which sent it back to
the Missouri Supreme Court. After many years of Nancy
being in a permanent coma, some of her friends came
forward and testified that she told them she would not
wish to live hooked up to tubes. On the basis of this clear
and convincing evidence, the Missouri Court allowed the
removal of the feeding tube. Thirteen days later, Nancy
Cruzan died of starvation and dehydration. Many people
argued that the withdrawal of the tube was a merciful
act, which allowed the patient to die in peace and digni-
ty. Others argued that the removal of the tube repre-
sented active euthanasia, which has not yet been univer-
sally sanctioned.
In Holland, active euthanasia under certain circum-
stances is legally permissible. However, opponents of the
law point out that some physicians are euthanizing
patients without their consent because of “poor quality
of life” such as severely handicapped newborns. This was
not the original intention of the Dutch legislation legal-
izing euthanasia. In the United states several referenda
in several states proposing legalization of euthanasia
have been defeated. Only in the state of Oregon is physi-
cian-assisted suicide, but not active euthanasia, legal.
The main reason for patients requesting physician-assist-
ed suicide is not pain and suffering but the desire to be
in control of one’s own destiny.
In the Nancy Cruzan Case, not everybody defended the
withdrawal of her feeding tube as a merciful act. A vocal
minority considered the withdrawal of her feeding tube
an act of murder or active euthanasia, since it was the
direct and proximate cause of her death thirteen days
later. This opposing minority equates the removal of
Nancy Cruzan’s feeding tube with shooting her in the
head. The headshot would kill her instantaneously and
the feeding tube removal resulted in her death two
weeks later. Both acts, however, are the direct and prox-
imate cause of her death and should be considered legal
murder without justification. Neither act is merciful but
directly causing the death of a person is legal murder. In
fact, some years ago in California, two physicians were
indicted for murder for withdrawing the feeding tube of
a similar terminally ill, non-curable patient. The charges
were dismissed and the physicians were exonerated. One
can thus argue both ways, the removal of a feeding tube
from a persistent vegetative state patient in persistent
coma or from a terminal patient with Alzheimer’s Disease
who cannot bring up secretions and suffers from repeat-
ed episodes of pneumonia can be considered a merciful
act in ending the suffering of the patient. But was Nancy
Cruzan really suffering? Did she have any physical pain?
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Was she sentient at all to feel mental pain? No one
knows. Certainly her parents, relatives, and friends were
suffering as they watched her in this condition. The doc-
tors, nurses, and other caregivers may have suffered emo-
tionally in caring for this poor unfortunate patient. The
state of Missouri was suffering since it cost them $22,000
per year to keep Nancy Cruzan in a nursing home. But
was Nancy herself suffering? Did she ever clearly enunci-
ate her autonomous decision not to be kept alive if she
were ever in a condition such as a permanent coma? No
one knows. Therefore some ethicists and some theolo-
gians can argue persuasively that the death of Nancy
Cruzan was an act of moral or even legal murder or at
least legal active euthanasia. It is not ethically or reli-
giously allowed to purchase the relief of suffering of
other people at the cost of taking the life of the patient.
Perhaps the first case involving the removal or with-
drawal of life support medical therapy is the New Jersey
case of Karen Ann Quinlan, another unfortunate young
woman in a persistent vegetative state. The parents of
the patient petitioned the courts in New Jersey to
remove the respirator from their daughter so she could
die in peace and dignity. They convinced the Supreme
Court of the State of New Jersey to allow the removal of
the respirator based on the supposition that would have
been the patient’s wish. In 1976, the respirator was
removed in this landmark case. Surprisingly, the patient
continued to breathe on her own without the respirator
but remained in her vegetative state of persistent coma.
When Mr. Quinlan, the patient’s father, was asked at that
time, “How about removing her feeding tube?” his
answer was, “Oh no, that is her life.” He obviously felt it
was morally wrong to end her life by withdrawing nutri-
tion and hydration. Every human being is entitled to
food and water, no matter how close to death they are.
Yet, Mr. Quinlan in 1976 would have condoned his
daughter’s death by the removal of the respirator by
seemingly paradoxical logic. Society in 1976 was not yet
ready to take the leap from removing a respirator to the
withholding or withdrawing of nutrition and hydration. 
Since then, many famous cases have occurred. In Florida,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the feeding tube of
Helen Corbett could be removed because the right to
refuse treatment is protected by both state and federal
constitutions. In California, Elizabeth Bouvia, who was
alert and competent, won the right to reject feeding by
nasogastric tube. In Massachusetts, Paul Brophy died
after his feeding tube was stopped by court order. In
New Jersey, the Supreme Court, exactly 10 years after the
Quinlan case, allowed the removal of a feeding tube
from Claire Conroy, determining that such a device
should be viewed in the same as other medical and nurs-
ing treatments. The same court ordered a nursing home
to participate against its will in the removal of the feed-
ing tube of Nancy Cellen Jobes. In New York, an
Appellate Court, in the Case of Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Center, decided that the withdrawal or
withholding of nutrition and hydration by artificial
means (i.e. feeding tube or intravenously) should be
evaluated in the same manner as any other medical pro-
cedure including the use of a respirator or other form of
life support equipment. The court also concluded that
where there is clear and convincing evidence that a
patient is in a persistent vegetative state, and not neces-
sarily terminally ill, and has expressed his or her prior
wishes to die with dignity and not be sustained by artifi-
cial means, these wishes must be given full considera-
tion. Many other similar court cases have come to similar
conclusions.
Thus, an extensive medical literature has emerged in the
past two decades supporting the notion that feeding
tubes and intravenous lines constitute medical therapy
and when not indicated in a given patient, may be with-
held or withdrawn. Prior to that time, perception of soci-
ety as well as the medical profession was that nutrition
and hydration by any route or portal of entry are not
medical treatments but supportive care no different than
skin care, grooming, or bowel and bladder care. Feeding
tubes and intravenous lines were considered simple con-
duits for food and water for a patient who is unable to
eat or drink on their own. Food and fluids are universal
needs whereas specific medical or surgical interventions
are not. Mr. Quinlan made a sharp distinction between
the provision of nutrition and the removal of the respi-
rator from his daughter in 1976, when he responded to
the question about removing her feeding tube with a
phrase, “Oh no, that is her nourishment.”
In a landmark statement in March 1986, the American
Medical Association’s (AMA) Council on Ethical and
Judicial affairs announced that, in certain limited circum-
stances life prolonging medical treatment, including
“medication and artificially or technologically applied res-
piration, nutrition or hydration” may be stopped or with-
held. There is today nearly universal support in the med-
ical, legal, ethical, and lay professions for this AMA posi-
tion. A small minority at the AMA objected, saying, “This
is a grievous error because death by starvation, dehydra-
tion, volume depletion, or a combination of these is not
death from the underlying disease processes and could be
considered euthanasia.” Others in the minority argued
that this development bears the seeds of a great potential
abuse since pulling the tube or pulling the plug are the
equivalent of euthanasia which is illegal in the United
States. I thus interpret the differences of opinion to hinge
on whether feeding tubes and hydration are medical
treatments and when appropriate may be ethically and
legally withheld or withdrawn. Alternately, feeding tubes
and hydration are part and parcel of supportive care, such
as turning the patient, singing, reading, talking or just lis-
tening to the patient who is dying. These general sup-
portive measures should not be abandoned if doing so
would hasten the patient’s death.
In the Judas-Christian system of ethics and values, human
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life is considered to be of infinite and inestimable value.
Therefore, one could argue philosophically that every
moment of a person’s life is also of supreme value.
Furthermore, a person’s life and body are not his own
property to do with as he wishes. The proprietor of all
life including human life is none other than God Himself.
My colleague, friend, mentor, and consultant, Rabbi J.
David Bleich, visiting Professor of Law at Yeshiva
University’s Cardoza Law School, told me personal privi-
lege as well as personal responsibility with regard to the
human body and human life are similar to the privilege
and responsibility of a bailee with regard to a bailment
with which he has been entrusted (Bleich, 2002). It is the
duty of a bailee who has accepted an object of value for
safekeeping to safeguard the bailment and to return it
to its rightful owner upon demand. Man is but a steward
over his human body and is charged with its preserva-
tion. He must abide by the limitations placed upon his
rights of use and enjoyment (Bleich, 2002).
Life with suffering is regarded as being, in many cases,
preferable to termination of life and with it elimination
of suffering. Life accompanied by pain may be preferable
to death. It may serve as atonement for the dying per-
son. It may serve to stimulate feelings of compassion and
altruism among the family members and caregivers or
even the recognition of their own mortality. These feel-
ings may facilitate their own fulfillment of the divine
plan of creation. Even when the life of a person on his
deathbed seems to be devoid of benefit, meaning or
purpose, the patient retains unique human value by
virtue of the role he plays in providing an opportunity of
love and compassion. Human life represents a purpose in
and of itself (i.e., sheer human existence is endowed with
moral value).
Many people may disagree with Rabbi Bleich’s view,
which is based on theological ethics and teachings, which
may at times appear to be rigorous, and fail to achieve
acceptance in a secular society (Bleich, 2002). Nevertheless,
concludes Rabbi Bleich (2002), an understanding and
appreciation of these traditions may result in the tem-
pering of some of the rather extreme views about end-
of-life issues such as active euthanasia and physician
assisted suicide that are currently in vogue. If some
doubt in engendered in the minds of physicians and
other caregivers tending to the needs of the terminally
ill, they may take to heart the fact that if they are to err,
better to err on the side of life.
My own view is that even if the courts and secular ethi-
cists sanction the withholding or withdrawal of fluids
and nutrition from the terminally ill and from chronic
vegetative state patients, what is legal and socially
acceptable is not always moral and merciful. The
patient’s or family’s right of starving or dehydrating the
patient to death does not mean that starvation and/or
dehydration are right. The medical literature is divided
about whether or not death by starvation and/or dehy-
dration is more painful and induces more suffering than
death with full nutrition and hydration. Finally, legal per-
missibility by court order to induce death by removing or
withholding food and hydration is not necessarily syn-
onymous with moral license to do so.
In the October 20th, 2003 issue of the conservative mag-
azine, The Weekly Standard, Wesley J. Smith, in an arti-
cle entitled “No Mercy in Florida,” discusses the case of
Terri Schiavo and what it portends. He categorically
states that this case illustrates how utterly vulnerable
people with profound cognitive disabilities have become
in this country. Not only are many routinely dehydrated
to death, both the conscious and the unconscious, but
often the people making decisions to stop food and
water, like Michael Schiavo in this case, have glaring con-
flicts of interest. No one would argue that under the cur-
rent universally accepted patient autonomy principle,
had Terri Schiavo orally or in writing previously expressed
her wish to have nutrition and hydration withheld or
withdrawn if she is ever in a persistent vegetative state
or permanent coma, her wishes would be honored with-
out debate.
Wesley Smith (2003) in his article in The Weekly Standard
quotes the most recent issue of the prestigious medical
journal, Critical Care Medicine. The authors of an article
in that journal, Robert D. Troug and Walter M. Robinson
(2003) from Harvard Medical School, urge the adoption
of an even more radical policy. They propose the dis-
carding of the “dead donor rule” which requires that
vital organ donors be dead before their organs can be
procured for transplantation. Troug and Robinson state
that “we prose that individuals who desire to donate
their organs and who are either neurologically devastat-
ed or imminently dying should be allowed to donate
their organs without first being declared dead.” Such
patients may still be considered alive if one refuses to
accept brain death as a valid definition of death, Smith
(2003) asserts that doctors should only be permitted to
procure organs from donors who have been declared
dead in the traditional manner because their hearts have
ceased beating without hope of restarting. He then
briefly discusses the issue of futile therapy and makes the
condemning accusation that “many practitioners of
bioethics, medicine and law no longer believe that peo-
ple like Terri Schiavo are fully human.” I strongly dis-
agree with his unsubstantiated statement which I believe
goes too far. Smith (2003) concludes his essay by assert-
ing “A nation is judged by the way it heals its most vul-
nerable citizens.” Therefore, there is a lot riding on the
Schiavo case. 
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